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Abstract 
 
While teaching first in Singapore and now in Manchester, it has come to my attention 
that there are certain difficulties in teaching translation theory either outside of 
Europe or, in Europe, to students from outside of Europe who come here to study. 
This paper concentrates on the role of examples in theoretical works, the problems 
they pose in teaching theory and the implications for universalism in translation 
studies. I draw on Edward Said’s discussion of travelling theory, post-colonial 
critiques of the hegemonic role of English, and skopos theory to propose two courses 
of action to help overcome the problem: first, the incorporation of the translation of 
theoretical material both from and into European languages as part of practical 
postgraduate training; and second, the use of a radical substitution policy for 
examples, with new examples centred around the target language, rather than 
preservation of the original examples, which are centred around the source-language. 
Using the example of China, I will demonstrate how these two strategies push us to 
reconsider how we approach teaching theory. Firstly, the translation of Chinese 
theoretical texts into English will allow for a deeper appreciation of writings in 
Chinese and their wider dissemination. Secondly, the search for examples which 
involve the target language should lead to an engagement between the target culture 
and the theory. Translating Vinay and Darbelnet’s path breaking essay on translation 
processes, for example, immediately raises the question of what exactly is meant by 
‘borrowing’ in the Chinese context, and for the need to distinguish between retaining 
the use of the roman alphabet and transliteration using Chinese characters, a 
distinction that would never arise between French, English and German. 
 
Keywords: translation theory, examples, Chinese 
 
Introduction 
 
Although not a specialist in foreign language acquisition or in teaching English as a 
foreign language, I have long been concerned with the teaching of theoretical texts in 
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translation studies to non-native speakers of English. These theoretical texts include 
translations from other languages (mainly German and French) into English, as well 
as translations from English into Chinese (which is my main foreign language, and 
the one most commonly shared by my students).  
 
Teaching such theoretical texts raises a variety of issues, in particular the question of 
examples and the problem of historical specificity versus universal applicability. For 
over a century, we have seen the imposition of Western European theoretical 
‘universals’ on the ‘East’, the ‘South’ or ‘the Rest’ (depending on which term you 
prefer). Tackling the challenge of development of universals today involves making 
models that come out of a wider range of experience across the humanities and social 
sciences. In translation studies in particular, there is a need to go beyond the 
triumvirate of English, French and German studies, and to go beyond East and West.  
 
In a postmodern vein, I begin this paper with a story of a young American who went 
to Asia to teach translation and how that experience changed his perception of his 
chosen field of study. You should detect in this preamble a very heavy whiff of 
postcolonialism.  
 
After that preamble, I discuss briefly some of the arguments for and against 
universalism in the humanities and social sciences in general. Then I lay out some of 
the more recent arguments in favour of universalism, especially in computational 
linguistics and their application to translation studies. The final section of the paper 
will be a discussion of how and why we might or might not want to continue looking 
for universals in translation studies, and how historical specificity might engage with 
it, taking into account various factors, including: the (non) translation of translation 
theory East-West; the importance of examples and case studies in translation theory; 
the importance of religion as a grounding for Universalism; and a modified view of 
what ‘universal’ means in the field today. 
Anecdote 
 
In 1999 I was hired by the department of Chinese Studies at the National University 
of Singapore to teach all levels of translation. Since primary and secondary education 
in Singapore is now in English, with ethnic Chinese students taking Mandarin 
Chinese as their required ‘Mother Tongue’ subject, there is a large bilingual English-
Chinese population there. Students in the Chinese department thus generally having 
fairly good skills in both languages, and Singaporean undergraduates are eminently 
suited for a translation programme. 
 
For the advanced module, I assigned three essays from Venuti’s Translation Studies 
Reader (2000) that I considered to be, if not easy, at least clearly written and engaged 
Journal of Foreign Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics 
 
133 
 
with specific strategies of translation: Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet, “A 
Methodology for Translation” (1958/2000), Katharina Reiss “Type, Kind and 
Individuality of Text: Decision making in translation” (1971/2000) and Hans 
Vermeer “Skopos and Commission in Translational Action” (1989/2000). 
 
To my surprise, the students claimed that the essays were extremely difficult, if not 
incomprehensible, and my plans for in-class discussion went nowhere. When I 
pressed them as to what exactly they had trouble following, it turned out that the 
main problem was the examples that the authors used to illustrate their points.  
 
All three essays had been translated: Vinay and Darbelnet from French, the articles 
by Reiss and by Vermeer from German. More importantly, all three essays contained 
concrete examples, which I had thought would make the theoretical model easier to 
understand. However, the translators of all three articles had left these examples in 
their original form, ie, a combination of French, German, Spanish, and English. 
Reiss’s article was possibly the most difficult, because most of her examples were of 
translation between French and German, or German by itself, with no translation into 
English. Perhaps because I have a reading knowledge of these languages, I had not 
noticed the oddity of presenting an essay in English where the examples, which were 
supposed to illustrate the theoretical premises, were all between two foreign 
languages. The article by Vinay and Darbelnet was slightly better, because all the 
examples were English-French, so the students could at least understand one half of 
each example, and the article by Vermeer did not contain as many examples.  
Subsequently, we worked through each section of the essays, coming up with 
English-Chinese examples to supplement the texts, which then resulted in the 
students understanding them much better, but also led to the result (surprising to me 
at the time) that not all of the points that the theorists had to make were relevant to 
Chinese-English translation. Yet all of these models were couched in the language of 
universal applicability.  
 
Vinet and Darbelnet are typical in this respect, beginning their article by stating: “At 
first the different methods or procedures seem to be countless, but they can be 
condensed to just seven, each one corresponding to a higher degree of complexity.” 
(1958/2000: 84) The remainder of the article consists of discussing each of the seven 
types, with examples of how these seven techniques can solve (presumably) any and 
all difficulties a translator might encounter. There is no indication that there might be 
exceptions, either in the sense of a text posing a problem that one or more of these 
seven techniques cannot solve, or in the sense of there being alternative techniques 
which might produce different but equally valid translations. They end their paper 
with a table that sets out the seven techniques by ‘level of difficulty”, but which also 
enumerates how on “the three planes of expression” (ie lexis, structures, and 
message) these techniques are valid (1958/2000: 92). Here again the use of the 
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definite article ‘the” suggests that there are only these three planes, thereby 
strengthening the universalist claims of their seven techniques to solve all possible 
problems. 
 
Reiss, in turn, says that text-type is a phenomenon going beyond a single linguistic or 
cultural context, because the following essentially different forms of written 
communication may be regarded as being present in every speech community with a 
culture based on the written word and also because every author of a text ought to 
decide in principle on one of the three forms before beginning to formulate his text. 
(1971/2000: 163, my italics) 
 
Clearly the repetition of ‘every’ suggests that Reiss believes she is describing a 
universal phenomenon, and she goes on to list exactly three of them. Vermeer, 
similarly, opens his article with sentences that contain phrases such as “any form of 
translational action”, “[a]ny action has an aim”, and “[t]he aim of any translational 
action”. (1989/2000: 221, my italics), all of which demonstrate his belief that skopos 
theory is valid for all translational activity. Furthermore, the article contains an 
explicit defense of its universal applicability. Having been criticized (Vermeer does 
not specify who the critics were), he mounts a two-pronged defense, insisting both 
that all actions have an aim (1989/2000: 224-5) and that all translations, even of 
literature, have an intention (1989/2000: 226-7). All three articles make these strong 
universal claims with the help of examples from just four modern European 
languages.  
It was the difficulty I experienced teaching this material in Singapore that first 
aroused my interest in the relation between the particular and the universal in 
translation theory. Currently in Manchester, I have noticed again that the non-native 
speakers of English from non Western-European countries often have similar 
problems in a module I teach, Translation and Interpreting Studies II. As a result, I 
now teach a module entitled “Practicum: Translating Theory” in which we address 
this specific problem.  
 
I will return to look at some passages from these texts in more detail later in this 
paper; in particular, I have a few suggestions as to what might be done about those 
translations. First, however, I need to make a detour to discuss universalism as a 
general phenomenon in the human sciences. 
 
The urge to universalism 
 
 Almost all theoretical models aspire to universalism, because all theoretical models 
are an attempt to generalize from the specific. The more widely applicable a theory 
is, the more powerful it is. There are many possible examples, but to choose just one, 
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we might examine post-colonial theory. Post-colonialism began as a movement 
among intellectuals living in, originally from, or studying the history of the Indian 
Subcontinent; an earlier term used to describe it was subaltern studies. That name 
derives from their attempt to theorize the development of Indian history under 
colonial rule, when the Indians were subalterns to the British, using Gramsci’s 
theoretical framework as a basis of their critique (see Guha 1982a, 1982b, and Guha 
1983). The term ‘subaltern studies’, which was fairly specific to that historical time 
and place, was gradually replaced by the more general term post-colonial studies. At 
the same time, the scope of ‘post’ in post-colonial was expanded (or generalized) in 
three ways. First, from what was originally conceived rather narrowly as countries 
which had been colonized by European powers but were now independent, the term 
came to refer to the entire history of colonial and post-colonial rule in such countries; 
in this sense ‘post’ meant ‘after the beginning of colonialism’ not ‘after the end of 
colonialism’. (Robinson 1997: 13) Second, from the originally specific European 
colonialism, post-colonialism was also used to refer to, and theorize about, the 
colonial relation in any time period and by any country, not just European. (ibid: 13-
14) Third, the term was metaphorized so that it could refer to situations where, 
although there was not strictly speaking a colonial situation (one country controlling 
another, including sending significant numbers of people to live for a period of time, 
if not permanently) to many types of unequal power relations (ibid: 14). So for 
example we can now talk about one culture having a post-colonial relation with 
another; we can also use the term post-colonial to refer to situations such as Russia’s 
relation to the Eastern Block during the Cold War. Paulina Gasior’s paper at a recent 
conference in Prague (2009), which proposes that the relationship between Eastern 
and Western Europe today can be characterized as post-colonial, and that therefore a 
post-colonial framework can be used to examine translations between Polish and 
English or French, illustrates how post-colonialism can be used in such a 
metaphorical sense. At present, then, post-colonial has developed from what was 
originally a very narrow historical and temporal period (trying to understand modern 
India in terms of the after-effects of British colonial rule) to a set of theoretical 
assumptions and methodological tools that aspires to be universally applicable to an 
extremely wide array of historical phenomena. 
 
In effect, everyone theorist dreams of coming up with something like Newton’s laws 
of gravity, which are seen as being universally applicable to all physical objects in 
the universe. Certainly we can say that, in its weaker form (ie, generalization) 
universalism is a necessary tendency in human thought. It is unimaginable that we 
could make sense of the world if we could not group things together and say that, for 
all intents and purposes, these things are identical in respect to certain properties, and 
therefore can be treated as identical. The problem occurs when that urge to 
universalize erases important differences, or when a theoretical model can not in fact 
adequately describe dissimilar phenomena as similar. 
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The attack on universalism 
 
As my reference to Newton indicates, the ‘gold standard’ for universalism has been 
the sciences since at least the nineteenth century, if not earlier. The apogee of this 
valuation of science as providing universal knowledge came perhaps in the first half 
of the twentieth century with the emergence of logical positivism, or logical 
empiricism, which tried to exclude all non-scientific knowledge from having any 
truth value (Uebel 2008). This did not, however, prevent theorists in the humanities 
from pursuing universal theories; rather, the link between science and truth in logical 
positivism inspired a decidedly scientific turn in certain fields of the humanities, 
including linguistics and therefore the emergent field of translation studies, and 
perhaps an even more ambitious desire to map out universals in those fields. Quine’s 
work on the philosophy of language, and its influence in translation studies, is but 
one example.1 
However, even as universalism in both the sciences and the humanities tried to make 
ever more ambitious claims, it came under attack in the twentieth century from a 
variety of angles.  
 
In the sciences, twentieth-century advances in both physics and mathematics were 
interpreted, paradoxically, as undermining truth claims. In physics, Einstein’s theory 
of relativity proved that Copernicus’s laws of motion were only special cases under 
‘ordinary’ conditions, and that in other situations they did not necessarily hold. The 
theory of relativity itself claims to be universally valid; however, it was and 
continues to be interpreted popularly as proving that everything is relative and that 
therefore there is no absolute truth. In addition, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 
which states that it is impossible to know both the position and the momentum of a 
particle (Hilgevoord 2008), was similarly interpreted as meaning that scientific 
knowledge could not be absolute and therefore could not make universal claims. Yet 
Hilgevoord states at the beginning of his article on the uncertainty principle that 
“Quantum mechanics is generally regarded as the physical theory that is our best 
candidate for a fundamental and universal description of the physical world.” (2008) 
Thus quantum mechanics itself (for which Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is one 
of the foundational elements) makes strong claims to universal truth.  
 
Turning to mathematics, it was mainly the work of Gödel and Tarski in the 1920s 
and 1930s that raised problems. Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems and Tarski’s 
theorem of the indefinability of truth (which builds partly on Gödel’s work; see 
Gómez-Torrente 2008) led to a radical, if limited, undermining of the definability of 
                                                     
1 Quine 1960; see Uebel 2008 for the way in which Quine was influenced by, but critical of, the Vienna 
Circle and some of their tenets of logical positivism. 
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truth in arithmetic (Kennedy 2008). The ways in which Gödel and Tarski’s work 
limits truth functions and universal claims in mathematics is limited to axiomatic 
systems (Shalizi 2009). However, as Shalizi also points out, it has been used 
fallaciously to argue that there is “some profound limitation on knowledge, science, 
mathematics” imposed by the theorems (Shalizi 2009). Sokal and Bricmont (1999: 
176-81) provide an example of such a use of Gödel’s theorems in the social sciences.  
 
Although scholars in the humanities may or may not understand quantum physics 
and theoretical mathematics, these theories, and the layman’s interpretation of them, 
have been used to caution against scientific ‘truth’ as absolute or universal. This view 
of scientific truth as ‘relative’ has been reinforced by the work of historians, 
sociologists and anthropologists of science.  
 
In the history of science, Philip Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), proposed the notion of paradigm shift. According to Kuhn, scientists shift 
from one paradigm to another, with different paradigms capable of explaining 
phenomena in different ways in varying degrees of usefulness.2 There is thus a strong 
suggestion that all paradigms are approximations of reality as we observe it, not 
Truth with a capital ‘T’. More recently, the work of Helen Longino (1990), Bruno 
Latour and Steven Woolgar (1986), and others have insisted upon the inescapable 
social element to scientific knowledge, challenging its claims to absolute, universal 
truth (for an overview see Longino 2008). 
 
These developments in history and sociology of science were linked to a more 
general post-structural trend in the social sciences. In particular, a distrust of ‘master 
narratives’ emerged. In history, for example, Hayden White (1973) attacked the idea 
that the historian was an objective collector of facts that were already out there as a 
myth. Instead, he saw all history as story-telling, often based on archetypal stories or 
myths. The subjectivity of the historian thus precluded any hope of reaching a 
description of what ‘really happened’, or an objective Truth. 
 
White’s work is only one example of the ‘post’ movement: post-modernism, post-
structuralism, post-colonialism, and deconstruction. Key to post-colonialism was the 
resistance to hegemony and received notions of truth. Post-structuralism sought to 
challenge the universal theoretical assumptions of structuralism. Post-modernism 
argued for the disappearance of “Truth” to be replaced by ‘truths’; and Derrida and 
                                                     
2 For example, although scientists may believe that Einstein’s model of the universe is more accurate 
than Copernicus’s, the vast majority of people, including physicists, live out their daily lives as if in a 
Copernican universe; moreover, a modern-day physicist sailing in a boat at night out of sight of land, 
using stars to navigate, is basing her decisions of how to steer on a Ptolemaic universe, wherein the stars 
are fixed points in the heavens and can thus be used to guide a traveler. Thanks to Douglas Allchin, 
personal communication, for this example. 
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others sought to dismantle the entire Western philosophical tradition, upon which 
claims for scientific and universal truths had been built. Finally, more recently, the 
New Historicism and Cultural Materialism have again insisted upon the historical 
situatedness of knowledge. 
 
The essay by J. Hillis Miller, “Border Crossings, Translating Theory: Ruth” (1996) is 
a good example of these trends, demonstrating both the power and the problems of 
post-structuralist arguments, like the worm Ouroboros. Miller argues that all literary 
theory is grounded in the interpretation of particular texts, and that therefore literary 
theory is untranslatable. Miller gives the examples of Derrida’s notion of 
dissemination as having been developed as a response to the poetry of Mallarmé, and 
Paul de Man’s “Resistance to Theory” as being rooted in his reading of the word 
‘fall’ in Keats’s The Fall of Hyperion (1996: 213). For Miller, there is thus always a 
tension between the universal pretensions of theory and its origins in specific 
historical and cultural knowledge. This means that, like any linguistic utterance, a 
theoretical model is always liable to distortion in the process of transmission from 
one culture to the next; there is not some meta-language of theory, as there is of 
mathematics. Yet Miller’s essay itself could be seen as falling prey to the same 
problem: he claims universal validity for his thesis that all theoretical models are 
inseparable from their roots. However, that thesis in turn emerges from the reading of 
a specific text: the story of Ruth in the Bible. 
 
Miller’s argument about the impossibility of translating theory is situated at the 
beginning of an article on traveling theory. While discussing the impossibility of 
translating theory, Miller also notes that, of course, theory continues to be translated 
all the time despite the problematic relation between universal and particular in 
theoretical discourse. This leads him to a discussion of the dangers of doing so, 
mainly in terms of cultural contamination or cultural colonialism. However, for 
Miller, there is another danger: that the theorist will lose control of his theory. I use 
the pronoun ‘he’ advisedly, because Miller is obviously talking about himself; he 
makes specific mention, more than once, of the fact that his own work has been 
translated into languages he does not read, like Chinese, and that he does not know 
what has happened to his theory in this process. There is, then, a contested power 
relation involved between author and translator, with Miller exhibiting a deep unease 
at the idea that ‘his’ work is circulating in forms that he cannot control. 
 
All in all, developments in mathematics, physics, history and sociology of science, 
and the ‘post-’ movement in the humanities led to universalism taking quite a beating 
in the second half of the twentieth century. 
   
The emergence of a new universalism 
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Developing in parallel to some of the events mentioned above, there has been 
continued interest in universalism, in some cases coming from a new direction: 
quantitative methods. 
 
The modern science of statistics and probability is a relatively young discipline, 
gradually evolving from several different areas between the seventeenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Stigler (1986) charts how at least three different impetuses (a 
flurry of interest in games of chance; the need to record exact measurements in the 
sciences, especially astronomy; the demands by emergent nation states to understand 
and control large populations through the collection and interpretation of census 
data) led to the development of sophisticated mathematical techniques for dealing 
with information in this new form.  
 
Statistics depends on the ability to count large numbers of things, breaking down 
information into simple, discrete categories that can be quantified. A typical 
example, and one of the earliest broad uses of these methods as applied to human 
activity, is the census. In a census, people are not treated as individuals having a 
history; they are treated as a collection of discrete bits of information (sex, race, age, 
profession, marital status, number of dependents, etc). Breaking someone down into 
these categories and quantifying them allows for easy manipulation of information 
and the generation of statistical knowledge (X% of the population is male; P% are 
under the age of 20; Q% are married; the average number of offspring is W). Such 
information could be enormously useful for many reasons. In London, the beginnings 
of the census were the Bills of Mortality, statistics regarding deaths that were 
collected to predict new outbreaks of the plague. It quickly came to be used in a 
variety of hard sciences, and was responsible for the emergence of most of the social 
sciences, which developed various tools, including mean and standard deviation, the 
rule of least squares, and regression analysis to help evaluate probability and 
reliability of data, to name but a few of the most common techniques (Stigler 1986). 
  
However, it was expensive and time-consuming to collect and then to process such 
data. Stigler (1986) mentions two early cases in the nineteenth century which give us 
an idea of the labour involved: the Incomplete Beta Function of Baye’s equation can 
be extremely difficult to calculate when certain variables are large numbers; he says 
that 
 
The first extensive tables of this function were not compiled until this century, 
when the students in Karl Pearson’s laboratory were pressed into reluctant 
service as ‘computers.’ A story, possibly apocryphal, still circulates in University 
College London of a student who resigned in disgust after a week, telling 
Pearson of his plans for a different career and announcing, ‘As far as I am 
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concerned, the Table of the Incomplete Beta Function may stay incomplete.’ 
(Stigler 1986: 130) 
 
The second involves the Ordnance Survey of England for 1858: The 1858 Ordnance 
Survey of the British Isles required the reduction of an immense mass of data through 
the use of least squares. The main triangulation was cast as a system of 1554 
equations involving 920 unknowns. Even though they broke the system into 21 
pieces of no more than 77 unknowns each before attempting a solution, the 
calculations took two teams of human ‘computers,’ working independently and in 
duplicate, two and a half years to complete (Stigler 1986: 158) 
 
Therefore it was not until the advent of computers that such techniques really came 
into their own, as the labour was prohibitively expensive for most researchers. 
Computers are ideally suited to do the ‘grunt’ work of statistical analysis, since of 
course computers are digital technology and therefore are most easily used to 
manipulate figures, performing in nanoseconds complex operations on huge amounts 
of data that might take a human being weeks.  
 
Along with the growing importance of computing to manipulate ever-larger datasets, 
sophisticated means of sampling to establish representativeness were established.  
 
Since the 1970s in linguistics, corpus studies deal with databases that contain 
millions of words. These corpora are then manipulated, drawing on the statistical 
techniques developed in the social sciences and mathematics to draw conclusions 
about language use. In the mid-1990s, researchers such as Mona Baker, Dorothy 
Kenny, and Sarah Laviosa began to apply corpus linguistics to translation studies by 
compiling parallel and comparable corpora. They proposed that lexical 
simplification, explicitation, and standardization were universals in translation. 
(Baker 1995; Kenny 2001; Laviosa 1998) 
 
On a more theoretical level in linguistics, the proposal by Noam Chomsky that the 
ability to use language was hard-wired into our brains, and that therefore there must 
be a limited set of universal, deep structures that generate all the permutations of 
known languages, also fueled the search for universals in both linguistics and in 
translation (Chomsky 1965 and 1981). This can probably most clearly be seen in the 
continued belief that machine translation was perfectible if linguistic structures could 
be properly understood and transformed into what was variously called a universal 
deep structure or an intermediary machine language, to and from which all human 
languages could be translated.3  
                                                     
3 For representative statements, see Andreev 1967; Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1988; and Hutchins and Somers 
1992, especially chapters 5, 6 and 13. 
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Universalism in Translation Studies today? 
 
I would now like to explore a bit more in detail how universalism and historical 
particularism intersect, not just in general in the humanities and sciences, but 
specifically in translation studies. 
First, I think one quite interesting phenomenon is the relative dearth of translation of 
translation theory. Given that translation studies should, of all disciplines, be open to 
translation, this is a rather paradoxical state of affairs. To take just one example, 
China, very little theoretical material is being translated either to or from Chinese and 
French, English, or German. From English into Chinese, two alternative strategies 
are employed: summaries and descriptions written by Chinese scholars, or the 
republication of theoretical texts in China in English. In the other direction, very little 
has been done on any level, the exceptions being the historical presentation of 
debates regarding translation in Cheung (2006) and Chan (2004). A similar situation 
holds for Russian; Russia had and has a large field of translation studies, but almost 
none of it is being made available in Western European languages.4 I am sure that 
this is true of other languages; to this day, Jiří Levý’s work is known in Western 
Europe basically from one paper only (Levý 2000).5 This means that theoretical 
models in the field of translation studies are being developed with very little input 
from one of the world’s major languages and cultures outside of Europe and North 
America. 
 
This in turn poses a danger in translation studies. We risk our theoretical models not 
being well understood, or rigorously tested against, the local situation in different 
parts of the globe and with different linguistic structures. How, then, can we be 
confident about the universal applicability of those theories? 
 
The role of examples and case studies in translation theory 
 
This last point brings me back to the role of examples and case studies in translation 
theory. I want to return now to the English translation of Katharina Reiss’s article, 
which I mentioned was the impetus for me to start thinking about these matters. 
Below are two excerpts from her work: 
 
Unintentional changes may arise from the different language structures as well as 
from differences in translating competence 
 
                                                     
4 Private communication, Sergey Tyulenev. 
5 I would like to thank Zuzana Jettmarová (2009) for drawing my attention to some of Levý’s other 
work. See Gile (2009) on this issue in relation to Japanese. 
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Ex. 1: Je suis allée à la gare (French: information about a female 
person; no information about the means of travel) 
Ich bin zum Bahnhof gegangen (German: no information about 
the person; information about the means of travel) 
= Linguistically conditioned communicative difference. 
 Ex. 2: La France est veuve. (Pompidou at the death of de Gaulle) 
Frankreich ist Witwe — Frankreich is Witwe geworden — 
Frankreich is verwitwet — Frankreich is verwaist [orphaned] 
  Linguistically conditioned: La France — Witwe [Widow] 
“Frankreich” is neuter in German. The image of “widow” is odd 
to a person ignorant of French. “Waise” [orphan] is also neuter; 
the image of an emotional attachment programmed differently. 
        (pp. 160-61) 
and further down: 
 
Written texts may have single or plural intentions. Plural intentions may be 
of the same rank and order. Mostly, however, one intention (and, with it, the 
text function) is dominant: 
 
Ex. 3: C vor o und u und a spricht man immer wie ein k; soll es wie ein 
c erklingen, lässt man die Cedille springen. 
 (mnemo-technical rhyme: 
 Intention 1 — to convey a rule 
 Intention 2 — to facilitate remembering by giving the text an 
artistic form 
Intention 3 — to “sweeten” the learning process by giving the 
text a pleasing form) 
      (p. 161-62) 
 
Here in the first example the source language is French and the target language is 
German, while in the second example, the example is only in German. In neither case 
did the translator provide an English translation.  
 
The vast majority of students in East Asia know neither of these languages (although 
a small minority will have learned some of one or the other). Moreover, the point on 
which the first example turns, the problem of mismatched gender of nouns in the two 
languages, is completely foreign to such students, who may know three or four 
languages, none of which feature gendered nouns, and will therefore be completely at 
sea. Such students, if they know English, might know mnemo-technical rhymes, such 
as “i before e except after c”, but of course cannot make any sense of the German. 
Instead of helping the students to understand the points Reiss is trying to make, the 
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examples thus serve only to frustrate the student, making the theory seem alien, 
incomprehensible and irrelevant because the example is opaque to her or him. 
 
Another, perhaps more ironic example, is the article by Vermeer concerning skopos 
theory. Skopos theory argues that the skopos, or purpose, of the translation is vital in 
determining the form that the finished translation should take. The skopos may 
derive from a variety of factors, including the commissioner, the translator, and the 
audience. Depending upon the skopos, different translations of even the same text 
into the same language by the same translator might look radically different from 
each other, and possibly also depart sharply from the source text. Yet the translation 
into English of Vermeer’s explanation of this theoretical approach to translation is 
itself full of examples between German, French, and Spanish, with seemingly no 
thought given to how the skopos of translating an article about skopos in translation 
might affect the examples used. In other words, if the skopos of the translation is to 
make Vermeer’s theoretical model understood by an English reader, how does 
leaving the examples in the original languages with no explanation help to fulfill the 
skopos of the translation?  
 
What exactly are examples used for anyway in these articles? Reiss, Vermeer, and 
other theorists use concrete examples for at least three different purposes. First, to 
demonstrate how their theoretical models function in relation to translation of actual 
texts. Second, to make the theory more accessible to the readers. Finally, to prove 
that the theoretical model is in fact valid by demonstrating that it can be applied to a 
real translation. However, when a student either does not know the source or the 
target language, then these goals are not being met. 
 
When teaching Reiss’s article in Singapore, I eventually came up with my own 
examples for the first example above that made sense to an audience bilingual in 
Chinese and English: 
   
 She went to buy eggs with her brother. 
 她跟她的弟弟一起去买鸡蛋。 
   additional information concerning respective age of siblings 
   less information about time and number. 
 
 请您把书放在桌子。 
 Please put the books on the desk. 
Additional information about number (plural) and object (desk is more 
specific than the Chinese term, which could also refer to a table) 
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Less information about formality of the situation (The Chinese pronoun 
is the polite form, similar to the way in which French has vous and 
tu) 
 
For the second example, I substituted the English mnemo-technical rhyme “i before e 
except after c”.6 
 
 When explaining this article to students in class and using these as additional 
examples, no one had a problem with it. However, when I later suggested to students 
that it would make more sense to substitute these examples for the original ones if 
the article were to be translated into Chinese, I encountered strong resistance. To the 
students, such substitution was a betrayal of the original. 
  
Taking examples outside of Europe 
 
Vinay and Darbelnet list seven techniques which translators can adopt, ranging from 
word-for-word translation to very extreme forms of adaptation. These seven 
techniques are illustrated with examples of translation between English and French 
for obvious reasons: Vinay and Darbelnet are Canadian, and these are the two official 
languages of that country. These techniques, which are developed in relation to two 
specific languages with a long history of interaction, are presented as the seven 
techniques of translation. In other words, they are presented as a complete and 
universal toolkit for any translator, working with any combination of languages. 
 
However, of the seven techniques they list, at least one is not directly applicable to 
Chinese. Procedure one, “direct borrowing”, is presented as being a ‘direct’ manner 
of using a word from French in English, as the historic theatre (from théâtre) or more 
recent borrowings such as déjà vu. This technique, however, actually does not make 
much sense in the case of English-Chinese translation because they use different 
writing systems. Instead, we need to distinguish between at least two different 
techniques.  
 
The first technique is Borrowing while retaining the use of roman alphabet, which 
results in a string of roman letters in the middle of a sentence otherwise composed of 
Chinese characters: 我不要买Persil, 我要买的是Daz [I don’t want to buy Persil, I 
want to buy Daz.] Although this technique was seldom used before the twentieth 
century, since at least the Republican Revolution of 1911 there have been periods 
when it has been widely practiced, especially by certain authors of the May Fourth 
                                                     
6 Reiss’s second example is the kind of rule (phonetic) she would like to see for her own work - in other 
words, a rule that is simple, hierarchic, and logical. 
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Movement in the 1920s and 1930s, and writers such as Yu Dafu (Levan 2007). The 
technique continues to be widely used, especially among bilingual speakers, although 
it is not in fact simply “direct borrowing”, but rather the creative re-use of English or 
other European languages in Chinese. Consider, for example the sentence “你 un-
不understand?” [do you or do you not understand?] Here a native speaker of Chinese 
has used a typical Chinese grammatical pattern of using the first part of a 
multisyllabic verb, followed by a marker of negation, and then full verb, to ask a 
question. In the process, however, the English word is used in a fashion that would 
be incomprehensible to an English speaker.  
 
Transliteration, on the other hand, which Vinay and Darbelnet do not mention, is 
the more commonly employed method of ‘borrowing’ a foreign loan word in 
Chinese, and involves finding roughly one Chinese character per syllable for a 
foreign word. Since the characters are chosen for their sound instead of their 
meaning, this results in a string of nonsense words, a bit like the famous 
transliteration of Mother Goose Rhymes into French by Luis d’Antin van Rooten as 
Mots d'Heures: Gousses, Rames (1980). When transliterating foreign words into 
Chinese, there are certain considerations to be kept in mind, especially regarding the 
appropriateness of the characters, either in isolation or in combination. For example, 
certain characters are avoided; you would not normally use the character “死” [si, to 
die], although one notable exception was an early transliteration of AIDS was 
“爱死病” [ai-si bing, love-to-death disease]. Also, certain combinations sometimes 
may result in unfortunate connotations, so that a company may choose a string of 
syllables that does not actually sound very close to the original term rather than get 
something such as “口渴口辣” [kouke koula, (makes you) thirsty and your mouth 
burn] for Coca Cola, which is instead rendered as “可口可乐” [kekou kele, tasty and 
pleasing].7 both of these techniques are also used in various hybrid forms, such as the 
commonly used T-血. (T-shirt), where the letter “T” is actually used as the first half 
of the word, with a transliteration of ‘shirt’ with the Chinese character “血” which is 
pronounced ‘xue’. The example of AIDS given above is similar, with the first two 
characters, ai-si, used for the sound of “AIDS”, and the final character, bing, which 
means disease, supplied for its meaning. One of the most famous stories of the May 
Fourth movement, mentioned above is entitled “阿Q正传” [The Story of Ah Q], 
where Chinese character Ah (阿) and the Roman letter “Q” were used together in the 
title and throughout the story to refer to the main character, Ah Q.  
There are in fact several other hybrid forms possible involving some of the other 
techniques Vinay and Darbelnet discuss. Two of the most common are borrowing 
and coining, and transliteration and coining. Thus once we begin to consider 
languages other than the ones originally used to develop Vinay and Darbelnet’s list, 
                                                     
7 : For more detailed discussions of transliteration, see Ching 1966 and Li 2007. 
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it becomes apparent that their list is neither exhaustive nor universal. The fact that 
English and French use the same writing system disguises a problem which emerges 
when we consider Chinese, Russian, Greek, or any other language that does not use 
the Roman alphabet. It is only when we look at how their techniques might be 
applied in a wide variety of cases that we can test their work’s claim to universalism.  
 
Moreover, once we have considered the Chinese case, and seen how transliteration 
results in words that do not actually sound exactly like the original English, we might 
wish to return to the examples of French and English, and ponder over why in some 
cases the accent marks have been preserved (déjà vu) or erased (theatre). If the 
accent marks are erased, is it really direct borrowing? Or what are we to make of 
their example of ‘direct borrowing’ into French of redingote, from the English 
“riding coat”, where the spelling has been modified? (1958/2000: 85) Even when the 
spelling is identical, the pronunciation is often changed; my favourite example is 
Goethe Street in Chicago, which is pronounced “go-eethy” by locals. 
 
Another possibility Vinay and Darbelnet do not mention is summary. This may 
perhaps be due to their adopting a fairly restricted definition of translation; however, 
in the world of professional language manipulation, this technique is widely 
practiced. Again to give a Chinese example, I mentioned that it is not common for 
European translation theory to be translated into Chinese; however, it is quite 
common for such theories to be ‘rewritten’, either in summary or adapted form, such 
as Liu Miqing’s 当代翻译理论 [Contemporary Translation Theory (1993)].  
 
Eugene Nida, although in many ways a very ‘old-fashioned’ theoretician, is actually 
much better regarding examples than many of his contemporaries, or indeed most 
recent theorists. His short essay “Principles of Translation as Exemplified in Bible 
Translating” (1959) uses many diverse examples from little-known languages, to 
make his case for dynamic equivalence. Moreover, since he cannot assume that his 
readers will be conversant with all the languages he cites, he carefully explains the 
linguistic context for each. In teaching Nida, I ask students to come up with examples 
of the types of things he is discussing in relation to their own language combination. 
This often reveals that they have not understood the reading, because they either 
cannot come up with an example, or their example is in fact incorrect. After I have 
given them several examples, the ideas seem to sink in better. So working through 
examples can be effective way of learning theory. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although universalism has come under attack from various quarters, we should not 
lose sight of the fact that, without generalization, we are left with atomistic facts that 
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do not add up to anything. Newton’s law of gravity is still the ‘gold standard’ against 
which most theories are measured. The attack by the ‘post’ movements 
(postmodernism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism) has been fairly effective in 
denying hope that we can achieve that sort of certainty in the human sciences. 
Instead, the emergence of computer-based number crunching has seen the emergence 
of statistical probability disguised as universalism.  
 
The challenge now is to build inclusive models that take into account the great range 
and variety of human linguistic expression and translation practice. Indeed, it would 
seem to be antithetical for a theoretical model based on statistics, which depends 
upon the concept of representativeness, not to be constructed on the basis of as wide 
a range of sample languages as possible.   
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